While Australian Labor in the 1980s and 1990s was not in the same welfarepioneering league as the First Labour Government (2), the Hawke/Keating period did see the reintroduction of a universal health care system (Medicare), a real effort to cope with problems of child poverty, the introduction of a mandated second-tier system of superannuation, and a serious attempt to subsidize the costs of child care for working mothers. Indeed, the figures tell us that during the period 1983-1996, the years of Labor rule, Australia was one of the leading OECD countries in terms of social expenditure growth. Total social spending went up by more than 4 percentage points of gross domestic product, compared with an OECD average of about 2.5 percentage points (calculation from OECD social expenditure database, with 1996 figures kindly supplied by the OECD Secretariat).
During the years of the Hawke/Keating government, my perspective on the Australian welfare state underwent a sea change. Over the past 15 or so years, I have argued in books and numerous academic articles that overseas criticism of Australian social policy was substantially misplaced (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) . Clearly, what Labor was doing contributed to my change in views. Until the Whitlam Labor government of the early 1970s introduced its Medibank system, Australia was one of the very few advanced countries of the Western world without a national health service. Moreover, when the Liberals destroyed Medibank after the fall of the Whitlam government, Australia became the first and only country in the Western world to dismantle this most popular bedrock of the social service state. The reestablishment of a national health service in 1984 was, therefore, a prerequisite for a positive reevaluation of Australia's welfare state.
But what Labor was doing was only part of the story. My changed reading of the nature of the Australian welfare state and its outcomes, in terms of goals such as the achievement of social and economic equality, was also a function of the realization that, on at least two major counts, criticism of Australian social policy development based on European analogies was misplaced. My argument was that Australia had created a welfare state "by other means" (7) than those used in Europe, and that it was far from obvious that Australian welfare outcomes were inferior to those in most other advanced nations. Now, in early 2001, as the Howard Liberal/National government comes to the end of its second term in office, and as I leave Australia to return to the United Kingdom, I am once more forced to reexamine my conclusions on the nature of Australia's welfare state. Although the government strongly denies it, the recent introduction of extensive tax subsidies to private health insurance, once again, calls into question Australia's commitment to a viable, national system of public health provision. No less fundamentally, the industrial relations reforms of the 1990s and the adoption of the kind of welfare reforms visualized in a recent government-sponsored report on welfare reform (the McClure Report; 8) will complete the process of tearing down the edifice of Australia's distinctive model of social provision. An increasingly residual health system will then be conjoined with a system of mean, discretionary, and moralistically charged social insurance benefits, wholly inappropriate to an advanced democratic nation.
The first reason why past criticism of the Australian welfare state was misplaced was that it failed to recognize a key aspect of Australia's institutional development in the 20th century. The Fathers of Federation included in the constitution the power to establish a system of compulsory conciliation and arbitration of industrial disputes. In the words of the first Chief Justice of the Court of Arbitration, Mr. H. B. Higgins, this created "a new province for law and order," in which courts decided, on social justice criteria, the wages appropriate for "the average employee regarded as a human being living in a civilized community" (9, p. 3). Arbitration delivered welfare "by other means" because in principle-and later in fact-it meant that those who were waged were able to maintain the conditions of a decent life for themselves and their dependents without further intervention by the state. Because of arbitration, Australia's wage dispersion was, right through until the 1980s, more equal than in most other countries (10) . Because of arbitration, waged poverty was far rarer in Australia than in other comparable nations (11) . And because of arbitration, Australian workers enjoyed a variety of benefits from their employers, such as sickness leave, which in other countries are counted as part of the welfare state (12, 13) . Given that the distinctive focus of social amelioration Australian-style was through regulation of the wage relationship, I called the Australian system a "wage-earner's welfare state" (3), a term that, for better or worse, has become part of the standard vocabulary of Australian social policy research (14) .
Since the early 1990s, the arbitration system has been under attack from both the left and the right. What unites this disparate body of opinion is a view that a centralized system of labor regulation reduces labor market flexibility: in the eyes of the right, the flexibility to respond to the changing realities of a globalized economy by paying workers strictly according to their contribution to total productivity; in the eyes of the trade unions, the flexibility to permit enterprises to pay wages in excess of award determinations. It was, in fact, Labor under Keating that started the ball rolling, transforming the awards system, first and foremost, into a safety-net device for the lower paid and providing far greater leeway for stronger unions to negotiate productivity increases at the enterprise level.
The industrial reforms of the post-1996 Liberal governments have continued the process of deregulation, further restricting the powers of federal arbitration tribunals, limiting the role of trade unions as bargaining agents, and further shifting the locus of bargaining to the enterprise level (15) . In its heyday, the awards system protected about 80 percent of Australian workers; that figure has now been reduced to about 50 percent of the working population (16) . As deregulation has been proceeding, wage disparities have been increasing (17) . The claim that Australia's welfare state "by other means" was sufficient to protect Australia's workers from waged poverty is no longer tenable, and it seems highly probable that further industrial relations reforms promised for Howard's third term will simply make the situation worse.
A second reason why much of the criticism of the Australian welfare state was misplaced was that it seriously misconceived the nature of Australia's need-based welfare provision. More than any other country in the Western world, Australia's social security system is based on tests of the incomes and assets of recipients. Indeed, during the Hawke years, the one major exception, the child benefit, became means-tested on much the same basis as other benefits. To many overseas commentators and to some domestic ones, this suggested that the Australian welfare state had not shrugged off the legacy of the European Poor Laws of the 19th century. These laws made sure that benefits were exclusively directed to those in extreme need and attached conditions to the receipt of welfare that made beneficiaries into second-or third-class citizens.
At its Dickensian worst in Victorian England, but also in many other countries of Western Europe-although never in Australia-the Poor Laws locked away the unfortunate in "work houses," where they undertook menial tasks for the pittance handed out by the poor law authorities. The whole idea was to make sure that being on welfare would make people "less eligible," thus ensuring that no one would choose to be on welfare rather than work. Even when work houses had disappeared, receipt of benefit was often at the discretion of local Boards of Guardians, who interrogated applicants in the most degrading manner. To prove you were eligible for benefit, you had to demonstrate that you and your children were without adequate means and that you were unable to support yourself despite your best efforts. Frequently, too, you had to prove that you were "deserving," having not reduced yourself to a state of poverty through moral infraction. Having done that, you were dependent on the discretion and charity of those who heard your case.
My argument was that the Australian system of means-tested benefits was nothing like this, for two reasons. First, Australian means-tested benefits were not focused on the very poor, but were designed to exclude only the well-off middle classes and the prosperous. Around 70 percent receive the age pension and few people see it as degrading to be a welfare beneficiary. The same principle applied to Labor's new child benefit; the income test only kicked in at a combined family income of about twice the average weekly wage. Second, the Australian system of benefits was designed to be as nondiscretionary as was humanly possible. There was no Board of Guardians or anything analogous. There was no issue of whether one was "deserving" or otherwise. To prove your eligibility you had to demonstrate that you fell in a particular category-old, unemployed, disabled, a single mother, and so on-and provide evidence that your income and/or assets fell below certain stipulated levels. Having done that, there was no major element of administrative discretion, seen by European social commentators as the key weakness of selective social policy systems in social justice terms (18, pp. 160-162) . In Australia, no one asked for a demonstration of need beyond the mere fact of a lack of income (except in the case of emergency payments), and the amount received was a simple function of a legally established formula, with additional supplements for a spouse and other dependents.
Nor were these features of the Australian welfare system-provision for the vast majority of ordinary Australians and an absence of discretion-aspects that had come into existence only in recent times. They were, in fact, an explicit expression of Australia's rejection of the Poor Law tradition and its expression of the idea that welfare was a citizen's right rather than an act of charity. Australia's first welfare state legislation, the New South Wales Old-Age Pensions Act of 1900, did not require the exhaustion of previous savings; it allowed individuals to have other income up to a certain limit and quite substantial holdings of property. As Kewley points out in discussing this Act and in contrasting it with more or less contemporaneous reforms in Denmark and New Zealand, there was "no space for the exercise of discretion (or of arbitrary action) on the part of an official in adjusting the rate of pension to individual circumstances. Given that he was eligible in other respects, it would have been within the competence of the applicant, knowing his means, to calculate the rate of pension to which he was entitled" (19, pp. 49-50) . For the next eight decades, the same principles governed all aspects of Australia's cash benefits system. If means-testing is interpreted as benefits focused exclusively on the poor and at the administrative discretion of the state, then Australia's system was not means-tested in the opprobrious sense that the term is commonly used in European social policy discourse.
From the time of the Hawke Labor government onward, the situation of welfare beneficiaries has been changing, and changing for the worse. There has been increasingly more policing of benefit eligibility, the strongest element of forced compliance being an unemployment work test that has become increasingly onerous to fulfill. Under the Howard government, the conditions of this test have become extremely strict, with an increasingly explicit moral justification that recipients must give back something to society in return for their benefit. This idea is now dignified as a philosophy of "mutual obligation." It is not a new philosophy, but an old one. To receive benefit, individuals must be able to prove they are "deserving" of society's help. With each new requirement for interview and for demonstrated job applications, the potential for discretion by officers of the newly privatized Howard employment services increases. Huge numbers of claimants are now fined for infringements of the rules, and the efficiency of these services is partly judged by its success in withholding benefits on these grounds. It is highly appropriate that the Howard government has tendered out these services to religious charities and that the chairperson of the government's welfare reform advisory body, Patrick McClure, is head of one of these charities, since the government is well on the way to restoring the conditionality of payment that makes welfare a charity rather than a right.
The unemployed have always been the welfare beneficiaries most vulnerable to public opinion. With the decline of the organized labor movement, there are no longer strong voices objecting to policing of the unemployed, although perceptions could very well change if and when unemployment is, once again, on the rise. This has made it quite natural for the Howard government to try out its "mutual obligation" ideas in the area of youth unemployment. "Work for the dole" was a test run of an idea, which the McClure Report now promises to make the key principle of a new social contract, for the older unemployed, some categories of the disabled, and single parents whose children are no longer dependent on full-time care. But what public opinion may concede in the area of unemployment, where ordinary workers may feel they have legitimate concerns that others will take advantage of the welfare state to be idle, may be found far more objectionable in other areas of social policy.
The McClure Report's argument for extending the scope of "mutual obligation" is that it is a mechanism that will assist beneficiaries back into the workplace and minimize the risk of permanent social exclusion (8) . The main agency of that assistance appears to be an emphasis on continuous counseling (rhetorically bundled rather neatly as "individualized service delivery") to inform beneficiaries of work and training opportunities and to find other strategies to get them ready for work. This sounds beneficent, perhaps. Clearly, the increased resources the review promises for such purposes are intended to sound that way. The trouble is that it also sounds very much as if we are about to reintroduce a massive infusion of administrative discretion by the back door. Every interview and every counseling session is a hurdle, where the single mother needs to demonstrate incapacity of some kind or finds herself forced back into the bottom end of the labor market. In a sanitized form, the stigma of the old Poor Law is introduced by the back door. One thing that the new prophets of "mutual obligation" always seem to forget is that the vast majority of clients of the welfare state already have a monstrously unpleasant time. They are by definition without adequate income or assets to live a decent life without assistance from the state. Policing their compliance (bureauspeak for what is going on here and in so many of the interaction between state and citizen) across a wide range of welfare benefits simply makes them "less eligible" in a new, but no less morally offensive, way.
So almost exactly 100 years after the New South Wales Old-Age Pensions Act rejected notions of discretion in welfare provision, and after eight or more decades in which the arbitration system struggled to deliver "fair wages," we now appear to be living in an era in which Australian governments-and judging by the pronouncements of the Opposition, Labor as well as Liberal-have abandoned both key components of welfare Australian-style. Moreover, Labor, in its bid to do nothing that will endanger its electoral prospects among middle-class swing voters, has also conceded tax subsidies for private health insurance. Given that welfare "by other means" led to a social policy system whose programmatic development was far weaker than that in other comparable nations-with the late emergence and continued vulnerability of the health system possibly the most flagrant example-there no longer seem to be any legitimate grounds for defending the Australian welfare state from its critics. Nor, it has to be said, does there seem to be any realistic prospect that a Labor victory in the election scheduled for later in 2001 will make any serious difference to the continuing validity of such a judgement. As one who views the role of the state in extending the economic and social protection afforded to its citizens as the key to the social progress of Western society in the 20th century, it is perhaps the right time for me to be saying farewell to Australia's welfare state.
Note -An earlier version of this article appeared in Eureka Street, Vol. 11, No. 1, January-February 2001.
